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Executive Registry
62-8414


15 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : JSC Request for USIB Consideration of the Security Situation in Pakistan

REFERENCE : JSC Memorandum for the Members of the Special Group (CI), CM-92-62

The Board of National Estimates' memorandum on the subject, in the form concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on this date, is attached hereto for transmittal to the Special Group (CI) in response to the JCS request contained in the reference.


Executive Secretary

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Attachment

cc: DDCI

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE USIB)

ES/USIB/JSL:mmk(15 Nov(62)

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

15 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Joint Chiefs Request for USIB Consideration
 of the Security Situation in Pakistan

REFERENCE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP
 (CI). CM-92-62

1. Referenced memorandum requests a USIB appraisal of the subversive insurgency situation in Pakistan, with particular emphasis on the Communist threat in East Pakistan.

2. For many years, various elements in East Pakistan have resented the greater influence and authority of West Pakistan in the country's affairs and have sought increased local autonomy. This has from time to time given rise to riots and demonstrations in East Pakistan, most recently in mid-September 1962. The leadership of these various movements is non-Communist, though the situation is of course subject to Communist exploitation.

3. Karachi TOAID 668 of 24 September, cited in referenced document, suggests an increase in the USAID's Public Safety program

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for Pakistan, assigning a "high medium priority" to the project and noting that "we do not anticipate subversion or insurgency to get out of hand in immediate future."

4. This latter judgment is confirmed in the Department of State memorandum for the Special Group (CI) (also cited in referenced memorandum) which also reflects the opinion of the recently returned Charge d'Affairs.

5. The same judgment is expressed in a DDP memorandum of 8 November, coordinated with othe CIA components concerned, and in

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[REDACTED] Headquarters. [REDACTED] recommends that the Special Group (CI) defer further consideration of this problem pending fully coordinated views of the Ambassador and Country Team.

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6. We do not believe that the threat of Communist insurgency in Pakistan is an urgent or immediate one. We recommend that the USIB not undertake at this time an appraisal of the internal security situation in Pakistan, until the receipt of the coordinated views of the US Ambassador to Pakistan and his Country Team.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

[REDACTED]

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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman